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The almost meteoric rise of Bitcoin has brought with it an investment boom in cryptocurren-
cies. The cryptocurrency markets however, are not functioning entirely as one would ex-
pect. Markets seem to have mispriced assets on a scale that would not happen in the 
stock market. Perhaps the most notable of these phenomena is the KimChi Premium or 
the relative overvaluing of bitcoins in Korea when compared to international markets 
 
The aim of the study will be to establish whether or not the KimChi premium exists, what is 
the scale of the premium and give some clues to why the premium has come about. 
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Then chapters 2-4 will explain the key ideas and concepts to understand the phenomena 
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exchange policy and Bitcoin as a larger phenomenon respectively. 
 
Chapters 5-6 are the research and conclusion chapters where the data collected is as-
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Bitcoinin arvo on noussut räjähdysmäisesti sijoitusvillityksen mukana. 
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Key Terms 
 
 
Altcoins refer to cryptocurrencies that are not Bitcoin. The word comes from alternative 
coin. 
 
Bitcoins are an electronic form of currency or an asset that can be traded peer-to-peer 
 
Bitcoin network used to refer to the larger network of bitcoin users, essentially covering 
not only bitcoin holders but also entities that use bitcoins intermittently. 
 
Blockchain refers to the distributed ledger underlying cryptocurrency transactions. 
 
Capital flight is a phenomena where individuals try to secure their assets by taking them 
out of the country, with obvious negative effects to the national economy. 
 
Classical arbitrage Is done when there is a divergence in prices between two locations 
and a trader buys where it is cheaper and sell where it is more expensive 
 
Currency controls are a range of methods to control international flows of money 
 
Fintech is technology for the financial sector, mostly focusing on software solutions. 
 
FOMO or the Fear Of Missing Out, a psychological effect where the one is constantly 
afraid of missing a great event or opportunity. In the investment world this can lead to 
questionable investment decisions. 
 
Foreign exchange or FX refers to transfers of money internationally 
 
Hodling (Hold On for Dear Life) is term coined to refer to an investment strategy in the 
cryptocurrency community, where the investor should just hold on to his investment and 
never sell. 
 
KimChi Premium refers to the positive price difference paid in South Korea for bitcoins 
when compared to international markets. 
 
Law of one price is a rule in economics where all assets that are the same should cost 
the same amount. 
 
Hedging means making investments that reduce the risk of an investment 
 
Pegging in this context refers to a currency having a set exchange rate making it unable 
to change. 
 
Portfolio in this context is a portfolio of assets. The purpose of portfolios is generally to 
diversify investments usually to reduce risk 
 
Risk-free rate Is a theoretical return from a risk-free asset, setting a baseline interest rate 
above which a premium is paid on riskier investments. 
 
Remittances are money flows from immigrants back to their families in their countries of 
origin. 
 
Triangular arbitrage can be done when there is a discrepancy in the exchange rates of-
fered on currencies, where through 3 transactions over 3 currencies a profit can be made. 
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1 Introduction 
Bitcoin and blockchain technologies have been the hot new thing in fintech that has been 
assumed to disrupt everything from the monetary system to the politics and society. Early 
adopters imagined a world completely reshaped by this groundbreaking discovery.  
Since its implementation in 2008 Bitcoin has changed its face many times, going from ob-
scurity to drug money to a savior or the harbinger of doom, depending on who you ask. 
Bitcoin prices have skyrocketed, and the question of what this actually means become rel-
evant. 
 
State actors have acted very differently from each other, showing that not even the top 
brass of our financial world can fully agree on what to do. Central banks in Europe have 
mostly only talked of regulation, China and a few others have either banned or brought se-
vere restrictions to trade while Japan has opened up to cryptocurrencies and is in the 
midst of a cryptocurrency boom. 
 
My personal interest comes from the perspective of a Finance student who has thought 
that bitcoin was a bubble that was going to burst since 2014 when I first came aware of 
the currency, this was due to my impression that Bitcoin is not backed by anything and the 
expectations shoved upon it seemed unrealistic. 
 
I was curious and kept developing my knowledge whenever I would happen upon articles 
and slowly became aware of Chinese traders and how they were circumventing capital 
controls by trading Bitcoin. It took me some months to realize that there should, as a re-
sult, be a price difference between the price of Bitcoin in Chinese Yuan and Dollars as it 
turns out there is. The KimChi premium turned out to be a more interesting research sub-
ject however, as China banned cryptocurrency exchanges and the KimChi premium be-
came famous overnight with allegedly huge 50% arbitrage opportunities. 
 
The questions I will be asking are: 
1. Are there arbitrage opportunities available in exchanging Euros to Korean Won through 
the use of Bitcoin. 
1.1 How large are the margins of this?  
1.2 Why does the opportunity exist? 
1.3 Why is the law of one price not applicable? 
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2 Arbitrage 
 Supply and Demand 
 
Supply and demand is a cornerstone of economic thinking and it is based on the supply 
and demand curves. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 50-54) 
The supply curve shows at what price producers or holders are willing to sell for example 
apples. So, if the price of apples go up, one would assume that apple producers will be in-
centivized to produce more. If the price goes down they might wish to produce something 
else that gets them more money. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 50-54) 
 
The demand curve is much like the supply 
curve but opposite. If prices of apples go 
down people will be happier to buy more, 
while if prices go up people will seek to re-
duce their consumption. (Matti Pohjola 
2015, 50-54) 
 
When you combine the two you get an 
equilibrium, where the right amount of ap-
ples are available at the right price. (Matti  
Pohjola 2015, 50-54) 
 
 Markets 
For perfect market to exist, Matti Pohjola in his book Taloustieteen oppikirja sets the fol-
lowing parameters. 
1. There are sufficient market participants with small enough shares of the market 
2. All products are homogenous, and buyers pay no interest on who they buy from 
3. All actors in the market have perfect information 
4. Actors are free to enter and leave markets and there are no limitations on the abil-
ity to produce 
 
As we can see the limitations on a market being perfect are very stringent and are unlikely 
to occur, so much so that coming up with an example of such conditions is exceedingly 
hard. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 38) 
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As we have seen the conditions for markets to always function perfectly are strenuous so 
to understand what is happening in the markets is often up to understanding the imperfec-
tions of the market.  (Matti Pohjola 2015, 112) 
 
Imperfect competition tends to arise when there is a lack of competition. This may be due 
to Monopolies or Oligopolies that push prices up in order to maximize their own profits and 
end up reducing the utility that society gets from their business. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 113) 
 
Natural monopolies are businesses like that are unlikely to be competed for. An example 
would be electricity distribution, where a competitor would have to rebuild the entire elec-
tricity network in order to be able to compete. Simply the cost of entering such a market is 
so high that market will always tend towards a single owner. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 113) 
 
The expenses of the government will always in the end have to be covered by tax income. 
In the markets taxation is pushed in to the pricing of products, no matter if the tax comes 
at the start or the end of the production cycle. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 113-114) 
The effects of taxation are then dependent on the price elasticity of the product. Price 
elasticity can be understood by asking a question like: If oil prices double, how much less 
gas will I consume? The more elastic the pricing is the greater the effect will be on con-
sumption. Gasoline is indeed a good example of inelastic consumption for example in Fin-
land over 50% of the price of gasoline is made up of taxes. This has still not brought an 
end to driving cars in Finland. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 113-114; Polttoaineveroprosentti-
laskuri) 
 
Externalities in this context is taken to mean the secondary effects of some actions. Edu-
cation is a good example, as education in itself does not produce any tradeable products, 
but is rather done for the possible future benefits an education can bring. From the per-
spective of a state it is worth educating people as they might pay more taxes in the future. 
There are also negative externalities, like for example child labor that reduces the ability of 
the children to develop in to adults who could have become more productive. (Matti Poh-
jola 2015, 115-119) 
 
Negative externalities can be controlled in a variety of ways. One is to use force like for 
example requiring children to go to school. Emissions trading is in vogue for reducing 
greenhouse emissions. And taxation of things like alcohol to reduce consumption and to 
acquire funds for treating externalities. Taxes to reduce negative externalities are called 
Pigou taxes, after A.C.Pigou (1877-1959) who was able to show that negative externali-
ties could be controlled through taxation. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 115-119) 
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Asymmetric information refers to market participants not knowing the same amount, and 
as such the one with more information will be able to make better financial solutions. A 
fruit peddler might well be aware that his fruit are rotten on the inside, but still sell them at 
full price to the unsuspecting customers. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 121-122) 
 
In the modern world there are institutions and laws aimed at stopping people from taking 
advantage of consumer or investor trust. In Finland Finanssivalvonta is tasked with over-
seeing the financial markets and has a far-reaching mandate to supervise and punish, if 
necessary, rogue actors. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 121-122) 
 
When it becomes apparent that counterparties have been playing foul, trust will erode, 
and trade as a whole might be stymied. This is what happened during the 2008 financial 
crisis, counterparties could no longer be sure of the liquidity of the banks they had dealt 
with and authorities had to step in to restore trust. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 121-122) 
 
Transaction costs can refer to several different types of costs when they do transactions 
or enter markets. Transaction costs are not merely the out-of-pocket costs incurred when 
doing a transaction, but also the opportunity cost of the time spent and the mental cost of 
managing transactions. (Zak Slayback 2016) 
 
Even as markets are generally considered a good way to organize economic activity, we 
can see that they don’t always work as they should. Therefore, governments and institu-
tions can improve the functioning of the market. Free markets also bring about inequality 
which can be addressed with taxation and remittances. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 110) 
 
The way governments act in a society is through institutions, and even as not all institu-
tions are run by the government, the government has the power to enforce the rule of the 
institutions they find necessary. Well working institutions work to bring about stability and 
trust in the society and enable markets to function better. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 110) 
 
Governments can also go a long way in suppressing the creation of Monopolies and Oli-
gopolies, as well as control the pricing of natural monopolies. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 110) 
 
 Assets  
An asset is a resource held by an entity for example a person that is held with the expec-
tation of it benefitting the holder in some way in the future. A financial way of thinking of an 
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asset is to think of it as something that will generate future cash flow either directly though 
getting money or indirectly by increasing other cash flows or reducing costs. (Investopedia 
(3)) 
 
In his book John C. Hull (2012, 24) notes that there can be assets of different kinds. Com-
modity assets require assessments of quality, these are things produced in the real world 
like corn that are rarely heterogenous in quality. Some commodities are traded in different 
quality ranges.  
 
Financial assets however are generally well defined. For example, there is no need to de-
fine the quality of a Bitcoin compared to another Bitcoin. (John C. Hull 2012, 24-25) 
 
Purchasing power parity to which I will from now on refer to as PPP is an example of the 
law of one price, containing the idea that the same goods or assets should be purchasa-
ble for the same price. How well this principle works in international markets is seen 
through the PPP. According to the law of supply and demand if a currency is underpriced 
then the products of that country should be 
cheaper, and demand should increase to 
bring the markets back to an equilibrium.  
(John L. Teall, 2013 185) 
 
A well-known example is the “Big Mac index” 
which measures how much a Big Mac costs 
at MacDonald’s. The index is meant to be a 
somewhat light-hearted look at PPP, but is 
gets the point across quite well. If the law of 
one price holds true a Big Mac should cost 
the same in all countries. If a Big Mac costs 
less in euros than in dollars we can claim that 
the euro is undervalued, or the dollar is over-
valued. (John L. Teall, 2013 185)  
 
Figure 2: The Big Mac implied over and undervalued-
ness of currencies (The Economist (1)) 
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To trade in assets there needs to be a mechanism in place to define its value, a widely 
known pricing model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM calculates the ex-
pected return of an asset through the risk involved.  
The risk is divided in to 2 parts:  
1. Systematic risk that affects the entire market and as such cannot be hedged 
against. 
2. Nonsystematic risk that is specific to a single asset and can be hedged against by 
diversification. 
CAPM is calculated with the following formula: 
 
Expected return = RF + β (RM -RF) 
Here  RF = The risk-free Rate 
 β = Is the systematic risk 
 RM = Is the market return rate 
 
Therefore, the β shows the sensitivity of the asset to the returns 
on the market. Example If the stock market yields increase by 
2% then a stock with a β of 1 will also increase 2% in yield or 
with a β = 2 the yield of the stock will increase by 4%. So, the β 
tracks how well an asset follows market movements. (John C. 
Hull 2012, 73-74)  
 
CAPM is however reliant on several assumptions to be functional  
1. Investors are only interested in the returns and the standard deviation of the asset 
2. Separate assets only correlate with each other through the market, having no in-
trinsic correlations between them 
3. All investors are focusing on the same time period for their returns 
4. Loans are equally available to all actors at the risk-free rate 
5. There are no taxes 
6. All investors look at the assets the same way, arriving at the same expected re-
turns. 
 
In the real world all these conditions will not hold true. One should be wary of using CAPM 
for the evaluation of single assets as results may not be very reliable. Nonetheless CAPM 
is a useful tool for investors if it is not taken as the be-all end-all truth. (John C. Hull 2012, 
73-74)  
Returns from a 
stock 
  
β  
3 % -0,4 
4 % -0,2 
5 % 0 
7 % 0,4 
9 % 0,8 
10 % 1 
11 % 1,2 
12 % 1,4 
The β of a stock when 
RF = 5% and RM = 10% 
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 Arbitrage 
Assuming that markets are prefect we can apply the law of supply and demand to come 
up with the law of one price. The law of one price states that all goods should have the 
same price. While we might know that markets are imperfect the law still plays in to ex-
change rates. Take for example that apples cost 1€ in Europe and 1,5$ in the US. This 
would imply an EUR/USD exchange rate of 1,5. While we can see that the law of one 
price is imperfect, we can still use it to analyze purchasing power parity and exchange 
rates, as it draws a line between prices at home and prices in foreign countries. 
 
Arbitrage is defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of assets or portfolios yield 
ing identical cash flows.” Arbitrage can be considered the most important pricing tool in 
modern finance. The idea of Arbitrage is that Assets that generate identical cash flows, re-
gardless if certain or risky, should be equally priced as stipulated by the law of one price. 
If assets that have the same yields but are traded at different prices, arbitrage can be 
done by first buying the cheaper asset and then selling the more expensive one. This is 
called, quite obviously, an arbitrage opportunity. (John L. Teall, 2013 144-145) 
 
Assuming that traders act rationally, when an arbitrage opportunity arises, they will imme-
diately sell the asset at a higher price and use the proceeds to finance the buying at the 
lower price. These traders are called Arbitrageurs. The arbitrageurs will continue to rein-
vest whatever profit they have made during their last round-trip in to the arbitrage oppor-
tunity, their capital growing exponentially, unless market prices change. The arbitrageur 
with his ever-increasing capital should cause pressure on the markets to change prices so 
that arbitrage is no longer possible. Arbitrageurs therefore insure that identical assets 
have identical prices assuming the markets are competitive. (John L. Teall, 2013 144-145) 
 
In its purest form arbitrage refers to classical arbitrage or trading the same specific asset 
immediately at a profit in 2 separate locations. Say for example a bottle of Vodka costs 
20€ in Tallinn and 40€ in Helsinki so an arbitrage opportunity exists. One could buy Vodka 
in Tallinn for 20€ and sell it in Helsinki for 40€. Assuming the trader can move from Hel-
sinki to Tallinn in 0 time and at 0 cost she can cash in on a classical arbitrage opportunity, 
making 20€ on each round-trip. In an idealized world the trades would also be executed 
simultaneously meaning that there would be no risk or capital required for the trader. 
(John L. Teall, 2013 144-145) 
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Were such a trading opportunity present itself it would attract more and more peddlers un-
til the laws of supply and demand force the 2 prices to be equal. This is the reason why in 
unimpeded free markets, arbitrage opportunities are unlikely to be available for very long. 
Things are even simpler in a crossed market. Say someone is offering to sell Nokia stock 
for 4€ and someone is simultaneously offering to buy some at 4,5€. One could simply exe-
cute the trade between the 2 and take the 0,50€ for himself. This can happen when 2 trad-
ers are unaware of each other’s offers or when prices are moving, and a trader reacts too 
slowly to withdraw his offer. (John L. Teall, 2013 144-145) 
 
Classical arbitrage opportunities are quite rare and what is usually talked about when re-
ferring to arbitrage is the trading of portfolios with similar cash flows. Options can be used 
to replicate cash flows from different assets as well. (John L. Teall, 2013 144-145) 
 
Also trade in offsetting securities that are strongly correlated can be considered arbitrage. 
For example, a mineral portfolio can correlate strongly with a mining industry stock, and if 
prices of the 2 diverge arbitrage opportunities might emerge. Quasi-arbitrage is a term of-
ten applied to these as they might not be subject to some types of risk either through di-
vergence of the assets or the inability to execute the transactions immediately. (John L. 
Teall, 2013 144-145) 
 
The law of one price is maintained through arbitrageurs, and as such arbitrage underlies 
relative securities valuation. This allows us to price individual securities or portfolios of se-
curities relative to one another. The price of a security should be the same as the value of 
a portfolio built to replicate it. According to John L Teall if the law of one price does not 
hold it is due to 1 of 2 reasons: 
1. An arbitrage opportunity currently exists 
2. The market is somehow imperfect  
 
In currency trading there is a possibility of triangular arbitrage. It functions by exploiting 
the relative price difference of 3 currencies. Say for example the following quotes are 
available for buying and selling.  
Say you have 1000 EUR, you could do the following: 
Trade your euros for 1250 USD 
Sell 1250 USD for 12500 SEK 
Buy 1045 EUR for 12500 SEK and make a 45-euro risk-free profit. 
 
The price discrepancy between the different currencies exchange rates create an arbi-
trage opportunity. This should bring in arbitrageurs looking to make a quick buck and 
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through the law of supply and demand bring the exchange rates to an equilibrium. (John 
L. Teall, 2013 184-185) 
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3 The economics of currency 
 Macroeconomics  
Macroeconomics studies the effects of economic policy, and asks questions like: what pol-
icies will help our economy grow? Macroeconomics utilizes data, economic models and 
historical trends as a basis for decision making. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 153-268) 
Economists strive for 3 goals: 
1. Maintain economic growth 
2. Limit unemployment 
3. Keep prices stable 
 
These are measured with 3 sets of data 
1. GDP or gross domestic product 
2. Unemployment rate 
3. Inflation rate 
 
These data points have had their fair share of criticisms, but to this day they seem the 
best indicators of economic wellbeing. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 153-268) 
 
 Exchange rate determination 
During the times of the gold standard governments would issue money in relation to their 
gold reserves and thus, at least in principle, the relative values of currencies were clear. 
This, however is no longer the case with free floating currencies nor do nations guarantee 
their currencies with gold. Therefore, the research in to exchange rates started in earnest 
after the end of the Bretton-Woods era in 1973. The free market controls exchange rates. 
As one might expect currencies are subject to the law of supply and demand, and interna-
tional markets can see the value of a currency change every second. (Paul R. Krugman, 
Maurice Obstfeld & Marc J. Melitz 2018 469-474) 
 
In September 2010, the finance minister of Brazil declared that the world was in a cur-
rency war. He said this, believing that wealthy countries were devaluing their currencies at 
Brazils expense. Whatever the truthfulness of this claim, he was on to the fact that eco-
nomic policy does not exist in a vacuum, and that other countries also influence each 
other with their policies. International cooperation on monetary policy has been on the 
cards but is still in its infancy. (Paul R. Krugman et al. 2018 469-474) 
 
Most developed economies, in modern times, have had a free-floating currency exchange 
rate. This has however not always been the case. All the way till end of the Bretton-
Woods exchange rate system, in 1973, major currencies have been tied either directly or 
indirectly to gold. Bretton-Woods was created in the aftermath of the second world war in 
1944. The US dollar was pegged to gold and could be exchanged for 35 USD per ounce 
of gold. Other large currencies would then be pegged to the US dollar and their respective 
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governments would maintain their currencies within narrow limits in terms of valuation. 
(Callum Henderson 2006, 107-108) 
 
As the US moved away from the gold standard, other countries then gave up their pegs 
and a large swath of the global economy now had free floating exchange rates. With the 
markets taking charge of exchange rates, not only relative to before but also in the way 
monetary policy was conducted. (Callum Henderson 2006, 107-108)  
 
 Government intervention 
Currencies being mostly free-floating has not brought an end to government interventions 
in monetary policy. Many nations have pegged their currencies, vowing to maintain an ex-
change rate at a set price. A pegged exchange rate will however require commitment to 
maintain and may prove to be costly to maintain in the long run. Even countries that do 
not directly intervene by pegging, can affect exchange rates by changing interest rates or 
printing money. (Callum Henderson 2006, 107-108) 
 
Even the strongest supporters of free trade have had to admit that governments have 
been able to stabilize situations that could otherwise been harmful to the economy. From 
this a balance has emerged between those who are for and against governments inter-
vening in exchange rates. Where intervention is sometimes seen as necessary but letting 
currencies float is preferred under normal circumstances. (Callum Henderson 2006, 107-
108) 
 
Economic intervention by the central banks has mostly become a rarity in the West. What 
is more common however are “verbal interventions” where authorities signal their inten-
tions and the markets react accordingly. (Callum Henderson 2006, 107-110) 
 
A key problem limiting government inter-
ventions in the currency markets is the im-
possible triangle. The impossible triangle of 
monetary policy is a demonstration of 3 
economic factors of which only 2 can exist 
at once. (Matti Pohjola 2015, 240) 
 
The points of the triangle are the following: 
-Stable foreign exchange rate meaning that the national currency can reliably be ex-
changed with the central bank at a given rate. 
Stable FX rate
Monetary 
independence
Economic 
integration
Figure 3 Impossible triangle 
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-Economic integration meaning that trade of both goods and currencies can flow freely 
without government intervention and all the difficulties that come with it. 
 
-Monetary independence, where the central bank can independently set monetary policy 
and for example devalue the national currency or adjust interest rates. (Matti Pohjola 
2015, 240) 
 
3.3.1 Pegging 
While central banks no longer guarantee the value of their currencies with gold, they do 
still sometimes maintain a peg. Pegging is a policy where a government guarantees an 
exchange rate by offering to buy and sell at a set exchange rate. A peg can be over or un-
dervalued depending on the political and economic goals of the one supporting it. (Daron 
Acemoglu, David Laibson & John A. List 2016 727-734) 
 
In terms of the impossible triangle pegging gives up independent monetary policy as the 
policies of the nation will have to somehow match economic conditions of the nation the 
currency is pegged to. 
 
A currency board is the hardest form of pegging without dollarization. The central bank 
that has adopted a hard peg gives up its ability to do independent monetary policy in ex-
change for the currency to maintain the value of the currency. The board pledges to ex-
change its own currency to the pegged currency, generally the dollar, at the rate set by 
the board. The exchange rate is thus unable to change as the board guarantees it. (Cal-
lum Henderson 2006, 114-119) 
 
The policy provides reliability and transparency but requires the nation to do whatever it 
takes to maintain the exchange rate. This often means adopting draconian measures to 
stop the exchange rate from changing. (Callum Henderson 2006, 114-119) 
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An overvalued peg is where for example the 
Mexican peso is maintained at a price 
slightly higher than it might otherwise be. 
This will reduce prices of foreign good within 
Mexico and control inflation. However, such 
a strategy requires foreign exchange re-
serves as the central bank must be ready to 
buy pesos in exchange for other currencies. 
This approach is aimed at increasing the de-
mand of the currency in question, therefore 
pushing the equilibrium upward. (Daron Ac-
emoglu, et al. 2016 727-734)  
 
An undervalued peg is what many consider 
China to do. Whenever the Chinese cur-
rency, the renminbi or yuan gains in value 
the central bank starts a buying programme, 
where it buys foreign currencies, pushing 
down the value of the renminbi. This type of 
a peg is much easier to maintain as the 
bank only needs to hold domestic currency 
to maintain the peg, and if needed can print 
more of it.  Here the bank brings the equilib-
rium price of the currency down by increas-
ing the supply of its domestic currency. (Da-
ron Acemoglu, et al. 2016 727-734) 
 
The “durability” of a peg can be tested and it can yield large profits for the winning side. 
Currency trader George Soros took a loan of 10 billion pounds and exchanged them for 
German marks expecting the relative value of the currencies to change. As the British 
government had a peg on the exchange rate between pounds and marks, they were 
forced in to selling their currency reserves to maintain the peg. In the end the British au-
thorities proved unable to support the peg as they ran out of reserves, bringing about a 
crash in the value of the pound. Soros was then able to pay back his loans at a discount 
as he took loans in pounds but was holding German marks. (Daron Acemoglu, et al. 2016 
727-734) 
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3.3.2 Currency controls 
Currency controls are a way or a country to 
manage its currency FX rate. This can be 
done to protect small and vulnerable econo-
mies from rapid exchange rate fluctuations. 
When trading volumes go down it requires 
less resources to change or maintain a mar-
ket equilibrium. This can be useful to limit the 
harmful effect of crises and markets “over-
shooting”, where the markets expect for the 
currency to lose value and it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophesy. In countries like China 
currency controls are also a way of limiting 
capital flight. (Investopedia (1), ZeroHedge)  
 
Currency controls work by reducing the supply or demand of the currency, effectively low-
ering quantities traded. There are a few ways a government can control currency ex-
change. Firstly, individuals can be banned from holding or using, all or specific foreign cur-
rencies. Secondly the government can monopolize exchanges, the monopoly can then set 
exchange rates, effectively making the person unable to sell his currency at the right price. 
Thirdly the quantities that can be exchanged can be limited. In China a citizen can only 
exchange 50 000 dollars worth of Renminbi a year. (Investopedia (1), export.gov) 
 
As we apply the law of supply and demand and what we know about currency controls we 
can conclude that when governments restrict trading in their respective currency they are 
distorting supply and demand. This is to mean that more people would like to buy or sell 
more currencies than is possible at the time. 
 
This in turns causes there to be a price difference between what the official exchange rate 
is and what is the real exchange rate according to supply and demand. When the differ-
ence between the 2 prices gets large enough black markets will emerge. Black-markets 
comprise mostly of individuals who want to trade something that they would otherwise be 
unable to get, at least not at the same price. This can be crime-related like drugs or in 
some extreme cases even necessities such as food. Trades are done “under the table” 
meaning without any official involvement, one of the reasons for black-markets existing is 
tax avoidance. (Investopedia (2)) 
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 Case of South Korea 
South Korea is a relatively small country, with an independent currency the Korean Won. 
The Korean won has suffered several crises for example during the 2008 financial crisis 
where the currency plummeted. The troubled history has caused the Korean government 
to be vary of fluctuations in the value of their currency. (The Economist (2), 2010) 
 
To minimize risks the Korean won is subject to currency controls. The range of measures 
extend from capping annual exchanges worth more than 50 000 dollars for individuals as 
well as setting limitations on banks in holding foreign derivatives. All this is meant to limit 
destabilizing currency flows. (The Economist (2), 2010) 
 
Despite restrictions South Korea has seen a Cryptocurrency boom with 3 out of 10 sala-
ried workers owning bitcoins directly. This has made South Korea the third largest Bitcoin 
market in the world with roughly 2 million investors or 1 in 25 South Koreans. With the rise 
of “cryptocurrency zombies”, people who can’t stop checking on their investments, there 
are even fears of “social or pathological phenomena” (Hailey Jo, 2017) 
 
The Korean government has aimed to limit trading in cryptocurrencies to domestic actors. 
This is achieved by limiting Korean cryptocurrency exchanges to people with a Korean ID. 
The KimChi premium had already born before the government stepped in, so the premium 
cannot be blamed on cryptocurrency regulations. The Korean government has also not 
defined whether bitcoins are currency or goods. Goods are controlled by the “Foreign 
Trade Act” and the “Foreign Exchange Transaction Act” requiring that bitcoins be declared 
to customs as imports. (Medium, 2018) 
 
The KimChi premium is a relative overpricing of cryptocurrencies, chiefly bitcoin, in rela-
tion to the exchange rate of Korean Won to other currencies. The overpricing of bitcoin in 
relation to the US dollar reached as high as 50% on the first of January 2018. (Medium, 
2018) 
 
Graph 1 The Kim-
Chi premium (Me-
dium, 2018) 
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4 Bitcoin 
 Bitcoin 
To give Bitcoin a backdrop one needs to take one step back. Therefore, I have chosen to 
see Bitcoin as a part of fintech. Fintech is short for financial technology. Fintech is not 
generally considered to contain platforms, but rather software for already existing plat-
forms. An example of this would be mobile banking applications. The goal of fintech is to 
provide electronic services for banking and finance through technology. (Ferratum, 2018) 
 
Digital currency and digital transactions have been around for some time. Digital currency 
refers to money stored and transferred electronically. This can refer to money on a bank 
account. Whenever you use your credit card you are using digital money. The money on 
your bank account is supposed to represent real money that physically exists. (Andrew 
Wagner 2014) 
 
 
Digital currencies have so far been based on a trusted third party as an intermediary to 
record and verify transactions. With the increasing digitalization of our society is slowly be-
coming cashless. There have been attempts to make fully digital currencies, like E-gold in 
1996 but they have not taken off for a variety of reasons. (Andrew Wagner 2014) 
 
Takeshi Nakamoto, the supposed creator of Bitcoin defines it in his white paper titled 
“Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” as a form of electronic cash that can be 
used peer-to-peer (P2P) without the need for a financial institution as an intermediary. 
(Satoshi Nakamoto 2008) 
 
In the paper Nakamoto outlines his solution to the weaknesses of the “trust-based model” 
that makes financial institutions act mediators for disputes. This cost then increases ser-
vice prices making small transactions impossible. A second issue Nakamoto refers to is 
the impossibility of making an irreversible payment for a non-reversible service. Reversi-
ble payments require trust from traders as customers can defraud the trader. Bitcoin with 
this P2P system could solve this problem by acting more like cash, ensuring payments 
cannot be reversed. (Satoshi Nakamoto 2008) 
 
The success of Bitcoin has brought with it other cryptocurrencies or alternative coins 
known as Altcoins. Altcoins usually try to improve on the blockchain technology of Bitcoin, 
  
19 
for example the Etherium blockchain among other new features is a platform for smart 
contracts. (Pavel Ciaian, Miroslava Rajcaniova & d’Artis Kancs) 
 
A study by Pavel Ciaian, Miroslava Rajcaniova and d’Artis Kancs on Virtual relationships, 
studying the interdependence of cryptocurrency prices found that a large majority of alt-
coins are purchased with Bitcoins and that Bitcoin and altcoin prices are interdependent, 
but more in the short than in the long run. (Pavel Ciaian, Miroslava, et al, 2017) 
 
The way Bitcoin works P2P is through a blockchain. The blockchain effectively works as a 
clearing house of Bitcoin transactions where people mining the blockchain confirm trans-
actions. The Blockchain then contains a ledger of all the transactions that have been 
made.  (Satoshi Nakamoto 2008) 
 
The more technical details of how the blockchain works have been “hashed” out by data 
scientists around the world. Jay Zeng in her engineer’s thesis “Bitcoin ja tietoturva” (2017) 
outlines 2 facts about Bitcoin. 
1. Bitcoin is not currently hackable 
2. Bitcoin is pseudonymous 
 
From these 2 facts we can conclude that Bitcoin is a valid asset that is not going to lose all 
value due to a hack. And Bitcoin can be used anonymously as long as the Bitcoin wallet 
and a person’s identity cannot be connected due to external reasons. (Jay Zeng 2017) 
 
The blockchain is sometimes referred to as a distributed ledger. This is in contrast to a 
centralized ledger. A centralized ledger is like a bank database where the bank holds a 
record of who owns how much money. A distributed ledger is a type of database that is 
shared among the users of the ledger. This means that the majority decide together which 
transactions are legitimate and which coins exist. (Mukesh Thakur, 2017) 
 
This technology has far more potential than just cryptocurrencies. For example Mukesh 
Thakur in his master’s thesis at the University of Helsinki researched the possibility of us-
ing blockchain to make an internet cloud service that would use the Etherium (an altcoin) 
blockchain to provide the platform for providing cloud services. This would avoid the pos-
sibility of someone hacking the cloud service providers database and attaining knowledge 
about the users as: “The contract transactions are immortal, anonymous, distributed and 
decentralized. These transactions can be veriﬁed by anyone in the network but cannot be 
decrypted by anyone than the owner.”. The study found that the current version was not 
scalable, due to the slowness of transactions, but there is immense potential for future de-
velopment. (Mukesh Thakur, 2017) 
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 Bitcoin transactions 
To use bitcoins, you will first need to create a wallet, acting as an address from which you 
can send and receive transactions. The wallet is combination of numbers and letters 20 
characters long and contains no personal identification, making holding bitcoins pseudon-
ymous. Bitcoins can be exchanged peer to peer, but generally bitcoins are traded in ex-
changes, where they can be turned in to other currencies. (Krista Uusitalo, 2017, Mukesh 
Thakur, 2017) 
 
 
Graph 2 retrieved: 26.3.2018 (bitcoincharts.com) 
 
There are several large exchanges, with the 8 largest exchanges averaging a little under 
10% of market share. Most trades (46%) are conducted in Japanese Yen and second 
most in American dollars (36%). (bitcoincharts.com) 
 
Transactions are confirmed by the computing power produced by Bitcoin miners. Accord-
ing to the Bank of Finland discussion papers, written by Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno 
and Ciamac Moallemi transactions serve 2 purposes in the Bitcoin economy: 
1. When new bitcoins are no longer given to miners they will receive transaction fees 
2. They choose transaction priority 
 
A trader can set a reward for his transaction, depending on how quickly he wants it com-
pleted. Miners will then accept the reward in exchange for confirming the transaction. Log-
ically the miner will confirm transactions that yield the greatest profit, making miners price 
takers not setters. Transactions are stochastic, meaning that even when there is sufficient 
computing power available to complete all transactions some transactions will be delayed. 
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The problem with the system is according to the study that the system creates an econ-
omy where transaction times need to be significant, so there is an incentive to pay the 
miners. This has led to transaction times and prices rising. (Gur Huberman, Jacob D. 
Leshno & Ciamac Moallemi, 2017)  
 
In 2017 CNBC wrote about people taking to Twitter when a 25$ transaction, cost 16$ to 
make while the average transaction cost 28$. The viability of transactions that exceed 
50% of the sum transferred in costs are feared to undermine the viability of Bitcoin as a 
currency. There is some hope that there will be more efficient answers in the future, how-
ever the community seems indecisive in implementing updates to improve the situation.  
(Ryan Browne, 2017)
 
Graph 3 Relationship of blocksize [transaction quantity] and transaction fees (Gur Huberman, Ja-
cob D. Leshno & Ciamac Moallemi, 2017) 
 
Mining bitcoins works much like a tournament, where the winner takes it all. Computers try 
to solve a mathematical problem by guessing and the one with the correct answer gets 
the reward. This process is purposefully resource-intensive as to make it impossibly ex-
pensive to hack the system. Someone with more computing power is more likely to solve 
the problem and get the reward. With the development of Bitcoin mining the mining has 
consolidated to larger players making “amateur” miners with consumer hardware ever 
more obsolete. (Adam S. Hayes, 2016) 
 
Mining Bitcoin has become such a large industry that it consumes massive amounts of en-
ergy. Diginomist, a platform intended to spread cryptocurrency knowledge, assesses the 
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current energy consumption of Bitcoin mining to be almost 60 terawatt hours annually, 
making it close to equaling the annual energy consumption of Kuwait. The energy con-
sumption is worrying environmentalists and there is growing concern over the sustainabil-
ity of the growth of the Bitcoin network. (Diginomist, 2018) 
 
 Who owns bitcoins? 
Adoption of new technologies is very aptly modeled by the adoption graph created by Ev-
erett M. Rogers. The basic idea being that not everyone starts using new innovations at 
the same time. Whenever a new innovation starts maturing questions of how much growth 
is still possible starts being asked. In this chapter we will be looking at the adoption of 
Bitcoin and blockchain technology, as well as which groups started adopting Bitcoin and 
when. (Everett M. Rogers, 1962) 
 
Graph 4 Adoption based on innovativeness (Everett M. Rogers, 1962, 247) 
 
Bitcoin trading started on exchanges in late 2010 and mainstream media attention started 
bringing in significant numbers of users during 2011. Before this Bitcoins were mostly 
owned by a small number of techies. Early adopters saw great potential in Bitcoin as a 
currency. In 2012 Jesse Lindroos from Haaga-Helia created a questionnaire where he 
asked Bitcoin owners about their opinions on why they have bitcoins, almost 80% an-
swered they were holding Bitcoin as an investment. While the sample size in the study is 
very small we can draw the conclusion that even in 2012 Bitcoin was acquired at least as 
much as an investment as a useable currency. (Jesse Lindroos, 2012) 
 
A study by Dániel Kondor, Márton Pósfai, István Csabai and Gábor Vattay studied the 
data stored in the blockchain. They found that increasing your wealth in the Bitcoin net-
work was fundamentally related to your ability to attract new connections. This is to mean 
that if you bring in new users, you will probably become wealthy as well. They also found 
that bitcoins are subject to preferential attachment, meaning in layman’s terms that the 
rich get richer. During the writing of the study in 2014, 6,28% of addresses owned 93,72% 
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of the currency. At the current (3.3.2018), according to bitinfocharts.com Bitcoin rich list, 
2,8% of addresses own 97% of the wealth. (Dániel Kondor, Márton Pósfai, István Csabai 
& Gábor Vattay, 2014) 
 
Graph 5 Growth of the Bitcoin network, exponential graph. (Kondor D, et al. 2013) 
 
4.3.1 Illegal uses 
The anonymity of trading in Bitcoin then started attracting trade in illegal substances. Per-
haps the most notable case of bitcoins being used for illegal trade was the Silk Road, a 
website where one could buy and sell practically anything in exchange for bitcoins. The 
site was started in 2011 and closed in 2013, although other similar sites have since been 
opened. The founder of Silk Road, Ross Ulbright was able to amass 1,2 Billion dollars 
worth of bitcoins, before the shutdown of his site and his own life sentence in prison. 
(Hope Reese, 2017) 
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In a less known case from 2017 a 
South Korean police officer was 
indicted for selling Korean won in 
exchange for Chinese Renminbi 
(Yuan). In essence the parties 
were running an illegal foreign 
exchange office that allowed 
anonymous customers to move 
Chinese money abroad anony-
mously. Mr. A was convicted in 
South Korea of violating foreign 
exchange laws. What this case 
highlights is the possibility and 
the profitability of bypassing capi-
tal controls with Bitcoin. 
(Kevin Helms, 2017) 
 
4.3.2 Legal uses 
The positive side of free in-
ternational transactions is 
to allow people working 
abroad remit money back 
home. The idea of remit-
tances is that people origi-
nating in poorer countries 
send money back home to 
their families. Traditional re-
mittance companies like 
Western Union have high 
transaction costs, with 
some countries averaging over 10% of the sums transferred. With the global average at 
over 7% (World Bank, 2017)  Graph 6 Average remittance costs 
(World Bank, 2017) 
 
With bitcoins the cost of remittances can, at least in theory, be reduced. Especially for 
smaller transactions. The benefits of using cryptocurrencies for remittances can be signifi-
•Selling YuanCustomer
•Buying bitcoins with 
said Yuans
•Transferring them to 
Mr. A
Mrs. C 
(In China)
•Selling the Bitcoins for 
Korean Won
•Transferring proceeds 
to bank accounts 
designated by 
customers
Mr. A
(In Korea)
Figure 7 Trading structure of a crime 
  
25 
cant. Sending Bitcoins can be immediate and transfer costs are often lower. Traders in re-
ceiving countries may also lack bank accounts and access to financial services making 
cryptocurrency transfers more accessible. (Scott Brett, 2016) 
 
The rise of public awareness and the price of bitcoin created a self-fulfilling prophesy 
where more investors would be drawn to Bitcoin due to potential gains as well as FOMO 
the fear of missing out. Gains upon gains ever since Bitcoins started to be traded have led 
investors to be optimistic about its prospects. But when prices are defined by expectations 
of future value how realistic are they? (Annie Nova, 2017) 
 
The investment community is split on the issue of Bitcoin. Warren Buffett for example 
came out saying that cryptocurrencies were fated to a “bad ending.” In response the CEO 
of Bitcoin exchange Binance Zhao Changpeng commented that Warren Buffett has no un-
derstanding of cryptocurrencies. (Colin Harper, 2018) 
 
Graham Rapier at Business Insider cites a report by Barclay’s that compared Bitcoin to a 
virus. According to business insider members of the population are in one of 3 categories: 
1. The susceptible 
2. The infected 
3. The immune 
 
The idea being that the susceptible are the people who are yet unaware of Bitcoin and 
are still susceptible to become investors. The infected are those who own bitcoins and 
the immune are the ones who know of Bitcoin but don’t invest in it.  What the report 
claims is that awareness has already risen high with 90% of the population being aware 
of Bitcoin. This, according to the report, means that Bitcoin will not be able to rise in price, 
as most of the population has become immune and significant numbers of new investors 
will no longer be joining the community. (Graham Rapier, 2018) 
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5 Empiricism 
 The hypothesis 
The empirical part of this study will focus of statisti-
cal analysis. The structure I will use was laid out by 
Jouni Peltonen in his teaching materials. I will also 
be using the book Tutkiva toiminta ja Ilmaisu, teos, 
tekeminen by Pirkko Anttila as a guide to writing 
this part. (J. Peltonen, 1997, Pirkko Anttila, 2006) 
 
The hypothesis we will be examining is:  
1. Are there arbitrage opportunities available in ex-
changing Euros to Korean Won through the use of 
Bitcoin. 
1.1 Why does the opportunity exist 
1.2 How large are the margins of this  
1.3 Why is the law of one price not applicable 
 
There are several ways to answer the initial ques-
tion. One would be an active answer where one 
would look whether there was currently an arbi-
trage opportunity. This option would be uninforma-
tive as the result would bring a simple yes or no an-
swer, with little possibility for further explanation or 
historical perspective. 
 
A second more reasonable approach is to look at the effects of such a phenomenon. One 
way to approach the effects would be to ask arbitrageurs if they were able to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity. Another would be to look at things like foreign exchange quan-
tities that would assumably have some correlation with the arbitrage opportunity. 
 
The most economical way to approach the question however is to look at publicly availa-
ble transaction data, taken from bitcoincharts.com and compare it to exchange rate data 
from the European Central bank. (bitcoincharts.com, 2018 , European Central Bank, 
2018) 
  
Graph 7 The process of statistical 
analysis (J. Peltonen, 1997) 
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 Specifying the sample 
What I aim to do is to take a look at whether or not there are arbitrage opportunities in ex-
changing Bitcoins to Korean Won and then back again to Euros. I plan to do this by first 
looking at the price differentials now and in the past 15 months and see if there really was 
or is a chance to theoretically make a profit. To do this I will need a suitably large sample 
to get an accurate idea of the prices at which Bitcoins have been available.  
 
The data is from bitcoincharts.com an organization dedicated to collecting and sharing 
Bitcoin related data. The data I will be using is transaction data from Bitcoin exchanges 
namely Kraken and Korbit both being leading exchanges in EUR/BTC and KRW/BTC 
trades respectively and both handling roughly 50% of transaction in said currencies. The 
exchange price comes in a similar format from the Europen Central banks reference ex-
change rates. 
 
I will be using methodology much akin to other Bitcoin research like for example the one 
that was used by Gina Pieters and Sofia Vivanco in their paper “Financial regulations and  
price inconsistencies across Bitcoin markets” where they study the price differentials be-
tween several different Bitcoin exchanges. They found that prices between exchanges did 
vary significantly depending on the liquidity of said markets. Prices however tended to re-
vert to those in larger markets, with the significant difference being in volatility not funda-
mental price differences. From this we can conclude that the price data from two of the 
largest, most liquid, cryptocurrency marketplaces can accurately reflect actual prices.  
 
The data is in CSV or comma separated 
values format where singular transactions 
in the marketplaces make up a single line. 
A single line of data would contain the time 
in UNIX format, the price at which the transaction was made as well as the quantity of 
bitcoins that was traded. The data files tended to be very large with tens of millions of 
rows of individual transactions. 
 
Individual transactions are recorded by the second in this data. To manage these millions 
of transactions the transactions were sifted down to daily values, the values being the high 
price of the day, the low price of the day and the average price of the day. The daily aver-
age is the unweighted average, in part to avoid single large transactions from setting the 
Time (UNIX) Price (Currency) Quantity (bitcoins)
Time (UNIX) Price (Currency) Quantity (bitcoins)
Time (UNIX) Price (Currency) Quantity (bitcoins)
Table 1 A visualization of the CSV data 
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daily average. The exchange rate data is already a daily reference rate and needed no al-
tering. 
 
The obvious problem that arises is that there certainly was no single price on any single 
day, but a series of sporadic transactions sometimes several on the same second and 
other times with minutes in between two transactions. There is also the fact that in ex-
changes there is a bid ask spread. This problem however cannot be economically solved 
as it is unlikely that trades are executed at the same exact second making matching 
trades to each other laborious and questionable in actual value. 
 
There is also the question of which data to use, minimum, maximum or average. I chose 
average as both the minimum and maximum can easily be outliers. There is also the pos-
sibility of using median or mean values, these however were not economical to acquire 
due to my use of Power Pivot. With 10 000 - 100 000+ transactions a day, singular outly-
ing values should have little effect on the average. The largest number of transactions in 
euros at Kraken was over 150 000 transactions in a day, while at Korbit it was over 
60 000. The daily average between 1.1.2017 and 26.3.2018 at Kraken and Korbit was 
over 32 000 and 11 000 transactions respectively. 
 
 Estimating arbitrage process 
For an arbitrage opportunity to be realizable it needs to be accessible, therefore we will 
take a look at the process with which arbitrage would be done and trying to indentify key 
points where problems may arise. 
 
Figure 8 Transactions required for arbitrage 
Exchanging 
EUR for BTC 
in Europe
Sending BTC 
to an Korean 
exchange
Exchanging 
BTC for KRW
Exchanging 
KRW for 
EUR
Transferring 
EUR back to 
Europe
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1. Buying bitcoins in Europe is straight forward with several exchanges available.  
2. Sending bitcoins to Korea is the first point where problems may arise, as men-
tioned in the chapter 3.3.3 Case of South Korea, as bitcoins might have to be de-
clared as imports possibly warranting taxes. 
3. Exchanging bitcoins for Korean won requires a Korean identity document effec-
tively limiting this part to Korean citizens.  
4.  
a. Once one has the won in hand one would need to find a way to bypass Korean 
currency controls to be able to exchange large quantities.  
b. A second option would be to send the money out as Korean won, still requiring li-
cense to do so 
5. Once the money is back in Europe the rest is straight forward 
 
Questions of legality and accessibility are not the only ones relevant here either. The next 
things to take account of are the transaction times and costs that will factor in to the calcu-
lations of any would-be arbitrageur. Bitcoin transactions can be handled in 10 minutes at 
best, making buying them and sending them fast. 
 
A prospective trader would then probably have to take the lower end of the bid-ask-spread 
and have the won sent to his account. Domestic transfers of money tend to take anywhere 
from a few minutes to a few days. For our example we can assume that the trader would 
find a way to optimize his transactions so as to make the transfers as fast as possible. 
Getting the money back to Europe is where the greatest delay would occur. International 
transfers go through the central banks that clear their balances during the night, meaning 
that all bank transactions abroad will take at least one day. All this is assuming that you 
have the allowance to transfer money abroad. 
 
With a loop of arbitrage taking at least a full day but more likely being out of reach from a 
perspective of an international investor. Even with access, the volatility of the market and 
the slowness of the transactions means that an investor would be unable to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity more than once in a day.  
 
The investor would then have to wait to find the perfect time to trade in his bitcoins, as he 
might be unable to pinpoint the peak time to sell, bringing in another layer of risk for the 
investor. With the time window for arbitrage being a few weeks at best, the investor would 
also need wait idly between periods where arbitrage is possible.  
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From this we can assume that transaction cost would play and I will make the assumption 
that transaction cost would be somewhere between 5% and 25% 
 
 The data 
With the help of Power Pivot I was able to able to assemble the data from the 2 ex-
changes and the ECB. 
 
Graph 8 1.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 at Korbit 
 
This is the price graph of bitcoin in Korean won Between 1.1.2017 and 26.3.2018. 
As we can see the price of bitcoin has grown exponentially in this time period only to then 
significantly fall. Prices in this chart are daily averages. From this data we can calculate a 
standard deviation as a measure of volatility as set out by Aki Taanila in his blog on statis-
tical methods. I did this by first calculating the logarithmic price changes and then by using 
the STDEV.P function in Excel. From this I took the (Aki Taanila, 2017)  
 
 
Graph 9 1.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 at Kraken 
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The price graph in euros is similar to the previous one, but one can already notice small 
differences in the graphs. 
 
Graph 10 1.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 ECB exchange rates 
 
The exchange rate seems to have been relatively stable in the last 15 months alternating 
between a little under 1200 KRW for 1 EUR and an around 1350 KRW for 1 EUR. Now we 
will take the 2 earlier sets of data and adjust them according to the exchange rate data.  
 
 
Here we start to see the divergence clearly, what we are interested in is the arbitrage op-
portunity, therefore it is meaningful to calculate the divergence in the 2 sets of data. To do 
this we will take the bitcoin implied exchange rate and divide it by the official exchange 
rate and deduct one. The result will be the divergence in %. 
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Graph 12 The divergence of the official exchange rate and implied exchange rate 1.1.2017 - 
26.3.2018 
 
Here is the graph that shows how much one could make with triangular arbitrage in a sin-
gle round, assuming no transaction costs. Let’s take a closer look at two periods of inter-
est. 
Starting in January interest in Bitcoin boomed in South Korea, with buyers paying almost 
20% in premium for buying Bitcoins in Korean won on the first week of the year. Notably 
the price of Bitcoin stayed slightly overvalued almost consistently all the way till mid-July 
where prices seemed to normalize. The price had several peaks in this time, with the pre-
mium going as high as 57% on the 25th of June 2017.  
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Graph 14 Premium paid on bitcoin 15.11.2017 - 15.3.2018      
These graphs show the situation between 15th of November and 12th of February. We can 
also see the premium find a second peak at 55% on 5th of January 2018 as on the 8th of 
February one could make a small 6% profit by buying Bitcoins for won and selling them in 
exchange for euros. The real thing of note however is the 72-day period between end of 
November and the beginning of February, where the prices remained consistently overval-
ued. Even more the premium remained uninterruptedly over 20% between December 21st 
and January 16th. 
 
 
Graph 15 Total weekly 
transactions at Korbit 
2.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 
 
The frequency of transac-
tions at Korbit in this time 
period also developed signif-
icantly in this time period. 
Showing a peak in interest. 
Interest seems to have 
peaked at the start of De-
cember, and it remains to be 
seen if there will be more 
peaks such as this one.  
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Not only were transaction quanti-
ties rising but also the extent of 
the mispricing in the markets. It 
should be noted that there were 
also moments where Bitcoins 
were underpriced in South Korea.  
 
My initial belief was that there 
would be an easy correlation be-
tween trading volumes and prices 
and thereby with premiums as 
well.  
 
Taking a look at graph 16 there is 
a correlation between prices and transaction quantities with a correlation coefficient of 
0,65 but the results are very spread out. Prices can not be predicted accurately with 
transaction quantities, rather transaction 
quantitites seem to set the bounds for 
prices. While from a statistical point of view 
the correlation is significant, the data is not 
useful when trying to pinpoint singular 
points in time. 
  
The inapplicability of transaction quantity 
for our purposes becomes clear when we 
compare the premiums and the transaction 
quantities, as the correlation coefficient be-
comes 0,37, still not insignificant but not 
useful for precise calculations. When us-
ing the data from Kraken we get similar graphs and coefficients. From this data we can 
conclude that we cannot assume that transaction prices will peak while arbitrage opportu-
nities are available. 
 
  
R² = 0,4259
Co rre lat ion  betw e en b i tc o in  pr i ce  
and t ransact io n  quant i t y  a t  Ko rb i t
Graph 16 Correlation 1.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 
Graph 17 Correlation 1.1.2017 - 26.3.2018 
R² = 0,1376
Corre lat ion  betw een 
premium and t ransact io n  
quant i t y
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6 Conclusions 
To recap the questions, we set out to solve were: 
1. Are there arbitrage opportunities available in exchanging Euros to Korean Won through 
the use of Bitcoin. 
1.4 How large are the margins of this?  
1.5 Why does the opportunity exist? 
1.6 Why is the law of one price not applicable? 
 
 
 Data approach 
By using the data, we can give answers to the 
questions. The data shows that there have 
been several days where bitcoins were overval-
ued in South Korea. For example, in 1 year 
(26.3.2017-26.3.2018) there were 41 days 
where the overpricing was over 20%. From this 
we can conclusively say that there exist arbi-
trage opportunities, at least on paper, on a 
semi-regular basis. 
 
The data gives no conclusive answer as to why 
the mispricing is happening. There was how-
ever increase in trading quantities as well as a correlated increase in prices. The results 
seem to confirm what was written by Dániel Kondor et al. that the rise in the value of 
Bitcoin is tied to an increase in the number of users, which can be shown in the strong 
correlation between the number of transactions and bitcoin prices. 
 
 Supply approach 
 
To solve the question of why the opportunity exists, a step back to supply and demand is 
needed. Price changes are driven by changes in supply and demand, price changes are 
driven by either decrease in supply or increase in demand. The increase in trading vol-
umes that is visible in graph 15 can be considered a signal that demand has increased as 
more people have entered the market and started trading, it also stands to reason that 
since the number or the supply of Bitcoins is almost fixed, prices should rise with the rise 
in demand. 
Graph 18 Number of days with overpricing 
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Even with increased demand, supply and demand should maintain the law of one price 
globally. So, something is happening in South Korea that is preventing the law of one 
price from equalizing Korean prices with global prices. The initial assumption is that mar-
kets are free and should function normally. However as was mentioned in chapter 3.3.3 
on the case of South Korea, we already know that markets are not allowed to function fully 
freely. As it is known that South Korea applies currency controls, we can ask if the cur-
rency controls can explain the price discrepancy. The currency controls reduce the supply 
of Korean won in global markets, pushing the relative value of the currency up in foreign 
markets where under free markets more people would buy Korean won. In domestic mar-
kets the effect is the opposite, where under free markets more people would sell Korean 
won in exchange for foreign currencies but are unable to. It should then be expected that 
the won would be undervalued inside South Korea. 
 
The observations show that bitcoins are overvalued in South Korea. Over- and undervalu-
ation are always related to each other as being overvalued means to be overvalued in re-
lation to something. It can therefore be claimed that the undervaluation of the won in Ko-
rea is the same thing as the overvaluation of bitcoins in Korea. It can therefore be said 
that the currency controls have a connection to the mispricing of bitcoins. 
 
A hypothetical bitcoin trader in South Korea could for example notice that bitcoins are 
cheaper abroad. He would then go to the bank and exchange his won in exchange for a 
foreign currency, there however he would be limited to the annual maximum of 50 000 
dollars worth of foreign exchange allowance. This would mean that once the trader had 
exhausted his allowance he would be unable to import more bitcoins, effectively stopping 
him from doing arbitrage.  
 
In this scenario, once all traders had exhausted their allowance, no more bitcoins could 
enter Korea, effectively making the Korean market trade with the bitcoins that are cur-
rently in the country. Assuming no more bitcoins could enter the country, prices should de-
velop independently as long as prices remain overvalued. If prices were to drop, bitcoins 
could still leave the country meaning that the price discrepancy should only go in one di-
rection. 
 
 Transaction cost approach 
The third thing to note from the data is the consistency with which prices are not in an 
equilibrium. The average day during the last 12 months had a price mismatch of over 7%, 
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this was in a situation where traders had nonzero access to foreign currencies. It is there-
fore reasonable to assume that there are other obstacles as well that are faced by arbitra-
geurs. The obvious one is transaction costs that were mentioned first in chapter 2.2 on 
markets and then examined in chapter 5.3 on the process of arbitrage. The fact that prices 
even under “normal” conditions are tending to be off by a few percentage points.  
 
The cost of transferring bitcoins is dependent on several factors, making accurate predic-
tions difficult. An assessment of what the costs generally are can be made through how 
large the arbitrage opportunities are before the price mismatches start to normalize. When 
the price mismatch did not grow rapidly, prices tended to diverge +/- 5% from a full equilib-
rium. Another clue can be found in the largest undervaluing of euros in Korea, where the 
mismatch peaked at just under 6%. 
 
With no currency controls in Europe we should assume that any undervaluedness of the 
euro should be arbitraged out as fast as possible, with maximum efficiency. The best 
proof for this is that there wasn’t a single case where euros were undervalued over 6% 
giving a good clue of the effects of the bounds set by transaction costs, not only directly in 
terms of money, but also the value of the volatility risk and other costs endured by the ar-
bitrageur. 
 
 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the phenomena of the KimChi Premium really does exist, but ac-
tual arbitrage opportunities are presented sporadically, there have been several cases 
where over 50% interest on investment could be earned in a single round of arbitrage.  
 
While there are many ways to approach the question of why the phenomena exist, a con-
nection can be drawn between currency controls and the mispricing of bitcoins. Transac-
tion costs also play a role when the costs of doing arbitrage are higher than the profit from 
said arbitrage. While it can be said that the law of one price is not working, actually prices 
have tended to revert to more normal levels over time, this shows that there are arbitra-
geurs out there, they just lack the ability to consistently maintain the law of one price in the 
short term. 
 
If the main obstacle for arbitrage is capital controls, there will be an economic incentive to 
find ways to bypass them. A case was mentioned earlier in chapter 4.3.1 where a Korean 
police officer was a part of what in essence was a money smuggling ring. If the profitability 
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of circumventing currency controls stays high, potential profits will pull people to illegal ac-
tivity. With the help of invisible transactions internationally money smuggling can be done 
on a level never seen before. The viability policies that attempt to artificially alter currency 
prices will be tested in the coming years as cryptocurrency markets mature. 
 
There is a sound argument to be made that markets will mature at some point and be-
come more stable. With more stable prices the odds of the market overshooting would de-
crease, and arbitrageurs would be able to maintain the price equilibrium more easily. 
Therefore it is not impossible that large arbitrage opportunities will no longer appear. 
 
Whatever the case, the value of bitcoin has seen exponential growth. Exponential growth 
has to reach a limit somewhere and investors expecting more exponential returns will be 
disappointed at some point. There will eventually be a reality check in the market and 
prices will then either become more stable, based on a more sustainable prediction of 
value or the markets will implode, with investors scrambling to cash in their bitcoins. 
 
Initially it was believed that the value of Bitcoin was directly related to the amount of illegal 
trade being done with it. As law enforcement will also inevitably become better at dealing 
with cryptocurrency related crime. Assuming it is no longer possible to hide illegal activity 
with Bitcoin, should it not logically also follow that the value of bitcoins would fall? If this is 
true the ever increasing regulation on bitcoin exchanges could affect bitcoin prices in the 
long run. 
 
The Bitcoin ecosystem does not produce any added value over time, there is no dividend 
paid on bitcoins owned. The market should essentially function as a zero-sum game, 
where all the money exchanged between traders came from other traders at some point. 
When in a stock market stocks pay dividends essentially making it possible for all parties 
to walk away with more money than they started with. As transactions are not free, if no 
new money enters the market, the markets should end up in a slow downward spiral de-
pending on what transaction expenditures are.  
 
A final point to consider should be the initial investors to invest in Bitcoin, who ended up 
making huge profits, these individuals often hold millions of euros worth of bitcoins and 
seem to have been “hodling” what they own. Or in other words not selling significant 
amounts of them. These investors will however have increased their expenditures to 
match their new-found wealth, meaning that large holders are likely to start regularly sell-
ing more and more of their bitcoins as they get used to a higher standard of living.  If its 
considered, that 97% of bitcoins are owned by under 3% of the community, who are likely 
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not actively circulating their portfolios, an increasing tendency to spend money by the 3% 
may significantly upset the balance of buyers and sellers. 
 
 
 
 Thoughts 
The study was able to use hard data from exchanges. The parts that utilize this data can 
be considered very reliable. The currency controls explanation is certainly a crude simplifi-
cation of a more complex situation, there are also other things that could be used to ex-
plain oddities in pricing. One explanation could be, for example that there are no large ar-
bitrageurs in this market. The explanations using currency controls and transaction costs 
required the least speculation, in that there is factual data about these phenomena, in the 
form of transaction data and government transcripts. 
 
Research in to cryptocurrencies and the blockchain are still in their infancy. The block-
chain technology seems very likely to be adopted more widely in the future, however the 
full extent of the practical uses of this technology are yet to be discovered. Cryptocurrency 
markets seem quite undeveloped and it is likely there will be more interesting phenomena 
to research in the future. 
 
The methodology used in this study was not exhaustive and much more information could 
be gained by taking an approach that is built on different sets of data, for example inter-
views with arbitrageurs or central bankers. 
 
The theoretical chapters could have been structured in a very different way, in order to put 
a focus on different theoretical aspects. For example there is a mathematical basis for ar-
bitrage, Chau Ngoc Huy wrote a 100-page thesis in the mathematical foundations of arbi-
trage with the name “A Study Of Arbitrage Opportunities In Financial Markets Without-
Martingale Measures”. Choices had to however be made on what to include and whether 
such an approach was economical and relevant for this study. (Chau Ngoc Huy, 2016) 
 
Writing the thesis has been a learning experience, being the first project of this size that I 
have done on my own. During this time I have had to learn time management skills to be 
able to keep writing this thesis. The ability to set out a project and work on it more or less  
independently is a skill I will need in my future career.  
 
  
40 
Getting immersed in the world of arbitrage has also opened my eyes for possible career 
opportunities in the financial sector. 
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